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The wise man is the one who has built his house upon rock. The
rain fell and the floods came and the winds blew and beat upon
the house, but it did not fall. It was founded on rock.
F OR US THE WISE MAN in this parable of Our Lord is the alert educator
who builds his parochial school on a solid, legal foundation. Impas-
sioned attacks and legal restraints will beat against the school, but it will
not fall. It is established on a sound juridical basis.
No educator today is so naive as to be blind to the necessity of a firm
legal status for parochial schools, but not all understand the nature of
the foundation. I therefore propose to draw a blueprint of the legal
foundation of our schools, to specify its ingredients and the reinforcement
that will assure its strength.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' the famous Oregon school decision of
1925, is the classic case which discloses the nature of the legal foundation
of the right to educate. There is, however, some confusion as to whether
the Supreme Court of the United States, in this historic decision, merely
upheld the property interest which the schools possessed, or whether
as a matter of law it also recognized the constitutional right of parents
to determine the character of their children's education. This point is
crucial because these are rights of a different order.
Few court decisions stand alone. They must be understood in terms
of their historical background and related cases. The Oregon case is not
an exception. Prior to this decision, the Supreme Court passed on the
constitutionality of a law enacted in Nebraska. 2 This law provided that
no foreign language could be taught in the non-public schools of the
state. It was enacted in an atmosphere of hostility to private schools -
the same Legislature having come within one vote of adopting a law
which would have forced all children to attend public schools. Only the
introduction of a bill to regulate private and parochial schools prevented
legislation which would have in effect eliminated all private educational
institutions. The law was challenged in the courts of Nebraska. The
*Member of the Legal Department, National Catholic Welfare Conference.
1268 U.S. 510 (1925).
2 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the con-
stitutionality of the law, and an appeal was
taken directly to the Supreme Court of the
United States. An examination of the Na-
tional Catholic Welfare Conference files has
disclosed many of the original documents
filed in the Nebraska case. Among them
was a private reporter's transcript of the
oral argument of Mr. Mullen, the attorney
for the Plaintiff. This document casts new
lighi on the origin and development of the
right of parents to control the education of
their children.
In the course of the oral argument an
interesting colloquy took place between Mr.
Mullen and Mr. Justice McReynolds. Mr.
Mullen argued very forcefully that the
Nebraska legislation involved more than a
denial of the property right of the teachers.
He indicated that in the last analysis the
legislation was directed at the right of the
parents to send their children to private
schools. At this point Mr. Justice McReyn-
olds interposed, saying:
"How did they abolish private schools?
Did the State prohibit private schools?"
Replying, Mr. Mullen observed:
"I say, your Honor, that they could no
more abolish private schools than they
could -"
Mr. Justice McReynolds broke in:
" I just wanted to see what you claim.
What about the power of the State to re-
quire the children to attend the, public
schools? . . . You will admit that, will
you not?"
Mr. Mullen's reply was clear and definitive:
"I do not admit that. I deny that a
State can, by a majority of the legislature,
require me to send my child to the public
schools."
He then proceeded to develop the prop-
osition that the parental right is within
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the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In conjunction with this argu-
ment, Mr. Mullen observed that there was
a close connection between the exercise of
the parental right and freedom of religion.
In a colloquy with Chief Justice Taft, he
argued that the liberty which is guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment includes re-
ligious freedom. Mr. Mullen, in taking this
position, laid the basis for the eventual ar-
gument that the right to send children to
parochial school rests not only on parental
right but also upon religious freedom.
Paradoxically, the Justice who intimated
that the state had a right to ban all private
schools wrote the opinion for the Court in-
validating the Nebraska statute. In the
course of his opinion, he stated:
[Plaintiff's] right . . . to teach and the
right of parents to engage him so to instruct
their children, we think, are within the lib-
erty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.3
He observed collaterally that, among
other rights, the Fourteenth Amendment
includes the right to the free exercise of
one's religion. Admittedly, this was not the
primary basis for the decision. It rested on
the property right of the teacher and the
right of parents whose children attended the
schools in question. Nevertheless, this was
the first time in the history of the Supreme
Court that the parental right to educate
was even obliquely associated with religious
freedom. It was a decision that broke new
ground and provided a fertile field for the
growth of principles establishing the right
to educate.
The comment of Arthur Mullen on the
decision of the Court is significant:
While the language prohibition was the
direct question involved, other important
personal rights have been passed on and es-
tablished. This decision means that freedom
3 Id. at 400.
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of religion, freedom of speech, the right to
maintain private education institutions and
the right of the parent to the control of his
children even as against the state, are pro-
tected by the provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment from unlawful state action.
The Court's recognition of the parental
right and its association of religious liberty
with this right represented a tremendous
victory, for at. the time of this decision pri-
vate education had its back to the wall.
Nineteen states had adopted legislation simi-
lar to the Nebraska law. Others were con-
sidering or had passed laws banning all
private schools, and these laws were not
merely the handiwork of a group of legis-
lators. Through initiatives and referenda the
people themselves were waging a war against
private schools. The decision of the Su-
preme Court in the Nebraska case was the
beginning of the end of this movement.
The Nebraska case had an immediate
impact on the now famous Oregon school
case.4 The Oregon law required that all chil-
dren attend public schools. It was challenged
and was soon before the United States Su-
preme Court. Attorneys for the State and
the Masonic Order (Scottish Rite) argued
that the control of the education of children
is within the power of the State, and there-
fore it could outlaw all private schools if
it determined that such action was advisable
and necessary for the promotion of the
public welfare. In this particular instance,
public welfare was equated with educational
efficiency and cultural orthodoxy.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme
Court invalidated the law. Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds, speaking for the Court, stated:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, we think it entirely plain that
the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians
4 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control. . . . The fun-
damental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes
any general power of the state to standard-
ize its children by forcing them to accept
instructions from public teachers only.5
Continuing, the Court further held that the
schools suffered an unwarranted destruc-
tion of their property contrary to the prop-
erty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Obviously, the Nebraska and Oregon de-
cisions are so interrelated that they should
be read as companion cases, jointly estab-
lishing the right of parents to control the
education of their children. Both cases ad-
mittedly involved property rights but the
Court and the attorneys treated these fac-
tors as secondary to the basic liberty of
parents - the cornerstone of the legal foun-
dation of the whole private school system.
Within a few years, another important
case was before the High Court, namely
Farrington v. Tokushige.6 It involved the
constitutionality of legislation enacted by
the Legislature of Hawaii which severely
regulated Japanese language schools, prac-
tically to the point of extinction. Attorneys
for the plaintiff conceded the right to enact
reasonable regulations, but contended that
the regulatory legislation in this instance was
so broad that it deprived parents of the
right to educate, contrary to the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court agreed, and observed
that the legislation would place the schools
under strict governmental control for which
the record disclosed no adequate reason. It
then stated that:
The general doctrine touching rights guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
Id. at 534.
6 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
owners, parents and children in respect of
attendance upon schools has been an-
nounced in [the] recent [Meyer and Pierce]
opinions.7
The Court then concluded that the Fifth
Amendment rights were the same as those
of the Fourteenth, and that there was clearly
a violation of these rights.
This little-known decision is extremely
important, for it holds that there are definite
constitutional limits on the power to regu-
late; even though the state strongly asserts
that such regulation is necessary to promote
educational welfare.
Over the next ten years a constitutional
revolution took place. At the time of the
Hawaiian case the Bill of Rights was con-
sidered to be binding only on the federal
government. Thus an aggrieved party could
not rely on the first ten amendments to the
Constitution in an effort to curb discrimi-
natory state practices. He was forced to rely
on the more generalized provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the spe-
cific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. In a
series of historic cases, the Court decreed
that the basic principles inherent in the Bill
of Rights were binding on states as well as
the federal government. In the case of Palko
v. Connecticut s the Court adopted the prop-
osition that:
... [I]mmunities that are valid as against
the federal government by force of the spe-
cific pledges of particular amendments have
been found to be implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, and thus, through the Four-
teenth Amendment, become valid as against
the states. 9
In another series of cases, involving Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, the Court firmly established
7 Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99
(1927).
8 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
9 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25
(1937).
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the principle that the religious liberty clause
of the First Amendment applies to action by
the states or their subdivisions. The exten-
sion of this principle to parochial schools
was a natural and easy one. It had been
anticipated as early as the Nebraska case,
where it was argued that the right to send
children to parochial schools is an exercise
of religious freedom. More recently, Pro-
fessor Corwiln, one of the outstanding au-
thorities on constitutional law, has stated:
* .*. [T]he parental right which was vindi-
cated in the Pierce case, whatever else it is,
must also be reckoned to be an element of
the right which the Constitution guarantees
to all to "the free exercise" of their reli-
gion.10
Even in the much criticized dissent of
Mr. Justice Rutledge in the Everson case 1
the proposition was affirmed that the right
to send children to religious schools, where
daily religious education is commingled with
secular subjects, is within the comprehen-
sive guarantee of the freedom of religion
clause of the First Amendment and enjoys
all of the protection which has been pro-
vided for First Amendment freedoms. 12
There has been no respectable deviation
from this proposition.
The significance of the change of em-
phasis from the Fourteenth to the First
10 Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School
Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 20 (1949).
11 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28
(1947) (dissenting opinion).
12 "For the protective purposes of this phase of
the basic freedom, street preaching, orai or by
distribution of literature, has been given 'the same
high estate under the First Amendment as . . .
worship in the churches and preaching from the
pulpits.' And on this basis parents have been held
entitled to send their children to private, religious
schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510.
Accordingly, daily religious education commingled
with secular is 'religion' within the guaranty's
comprehensive scope." Id. at 32-33.
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Amendment cannot be underestimated. For
example, the Supreme Court, during the last
decade, has consistently held that the test
of legislation which conflicts with the First
Amendment is much more definite than
the test when only a Fourteenth Amend-
ment right is involved. Much of the vague-
ness and generality of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment disappears
when the specific provisions of the First
Amendment are applied as a standard. One
of the best expositions of the difference be-
tween a Fourteenth Amendment and a First
Amendment right is contained in the fol-
lowing excerpt from the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Board of Education v.
Barnette. 3 There the Court observed that:
The right of a State to regulate, for ex-
ample, a public utility may well include, so
far as the due process test is concerned,
power to impose all of the restrictions which
a legislature may have a "rational basis" for
adopting. But freedoms of speech and of
press, of assembly, and of worship may not
be infringed on such slender grounds. They
are susceptible of restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests
which the State may lawfully protect. It is
important to note that while it is the Four-
teenth Amendment which bears directly
upon the State it is the more specific limiting
principles of the First Amendment that fi-
nally govern this case. 14
In other words, rights which depend exclu-
sively upon the Fourteenth Amendment are
much more vulnerable to state infringement
than those protected by the specific guar-
antees of the First Amendment.
This admittedly is a big dose of law. As
a matter of fact, it is a synthesis of a whole
constitutional revolution, the ultimate im-
plications of which have yet to be fully
13 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
14 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943).
evaluated; however, it is clear that as a
result of this development the status of
parochial schools is stronger and more se-
cure today than at any other time in their
history. The reinforcing rods of the First
Amendment have given a new strength and
resiliency to the foundation on which the
parochial school system rests. The signifi-
cance of this factor is readily apparent when
we apply it to particular cases affecting our
schools. Take, for example, the field of reg-
ulation of non-public schools. There is no
question about the right of the State, which
has a secondary interest in education, to
insist upon regulatory measures to guard
the health and safety of children. The report-
ing of attendance and similar information
may likewise be demanded. Unfortunately,
today there is a tendency to enact laws
which go far beyond the area of legitimate
regulation.
Currently there is a general movement
to secure the adoption of comprehensive
regulatory laws - spearheaded by the Na-
tional Council of Chief State School Officers.
Within the last few years, this organization
held a series of workshops on this subject.
It has taken the position that the State
has the responsibility to adopt regulations
providing for the licensing, chartering or
approval of all non-public schools. Such
regulatory legislation would be in the nature
of prior approval of private schools. Re-
cently the Office of Education issued a
substantial document, The State and the
Non-Public Schools, developing the extent
to which non-public schools are subject to
regulation. This study was made at the re-
quest of the Chief State School Officers, and
undoubtedly will stimulate further consider-
ation of the problem.
This movement may be attributed to
several factors. Many fly-by-night schools
grew up as a result of the "G.I. Bill" legis-
lation. Also, the practice of regulating
schools has evolved against the background
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus the
State only had to demonstrate that it had a
rational basis for its legislation, which nat-
urally resulted in the enactment of broad
regulatory laws. Moreover, no serious at-
tempt was made to distinguish between fly-
by-night schools and our parochial schools,
which the Church subjects to supervision in
order to maintain the acceptable school de-
manded by the Encyclical on Education and
by the Third Council of Baltimore.
Indiscriminate application of school reg-
ulations must cease, for our parochial
schools, which are protected by the First
Amendment, may only be regulated in ac-
cordance with standards acceptable under
this amendment. Let us now examine the
delimitations of the First Amendment.
An analysis of Supreme Court decisions
applying the freedom of religion clause to
state action discloses that ordinances and
statutes which impose prior restraints on
religion are invariably held to be uncon-
stitutional. Such laws requiring licensing or
other forms of prior approval of religious
activities have been uniformly condemned.
This attitude has prevailed even when there
was an intermingling of religious and secu-
lar activities. 15 It may, therefore, be asserted
that state regulatory laws which require a
parochial school to secure prior approval
from public officials before it may open its
doors is contrary to settled constitutional
law. On the other hand, the State may adopt
certain minimal standards relating to the
health and safety of school children and
then proceed to take appropriate action if
school authorities without cause refuse to
15 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1958
adhere to such standards. This approach
which is based on the occurrence of subse-
quent events does not have the vitiating
characteristic of prior restraints.
Finally, these minimal standards must be
specifically set forth in law. For example,
legislation which places regulatory power
within the absolute control and discretion
of state school officials is constitutionally
vulnerable for it gives the Superintendent of
Education or the State School Board arbi-
trary power over the life and death of pri-
vate schools.1"
In summary, it is submitted that state reg-
ulation of parochial schools:
1. must have a grave justification;
2. may not involve the formula of
prior approval; and
3. must be based on clear legislative
standards.
These conclusions stem primarily from
the First Amendment and demonstrate the
necessity of acquiring a thorough knowledge
of its educational implications. With such
knowledge, comprehensive regulatory laws
which contain any of the above objection-
able characteristics may more effectively be
opposed or, alternatively, an exemption may
be requested for all .parochial schools. Prec-
edent for this action may be found in a
general exemption of parochial schools
from broad regulatory legislation in the
states of Maryland and New York.
In addition to the threat of excessive reg-
ulation and supervision, our schools are
confronted with another oblique attack
through the medium of zoning legislation.
The rapid growth of suburbs has developed
a trend which goes far beyond the original
concept of zoning-out commercial estab-
16School Dist. v. Decker, 159 Neb. 693, 68
N.W. 2d 354 (1955).
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lishments; on the contrary, it would pre-
vent private schools from being established
in residential areas. Here again a knowledge
of the extent of the legal foundation of our
schools is essential. Two important cases
graphically demonstrate this point. In the
first case, 17 a Milwaukee suburb adopted an
ordinance which permitted the building of
public and private elementary schools in
Zone A, but on the high school level per-
mited only public schools. Representatives
of the Lutheran Church requested a permit
to erect a high school in Zone A. The build-
ing inspector declined, and an action was
brought to force him to grant the necessary
permit. The lower court, acting in harmony
with existing legal authority, directed the
issuance of ,the building permit; but was
reversed by the Supreme Court of the State
which admitted that public and private
schools would impose the same burdens on
the community, but declared:
Whether the private school is sectarian or
commercial, . . . it discriminates and the
public school does not. The private school
... does not compensate the community in
the same manner or to the same extent.' s
The court thereupon concluded that since
the private school does not make the same
contribution to the public welfare of the
community, such a difference could be taken
into consideration by the legislative body
in framing its ordinance. Unfortunately, the
attorney relied exclusively on the reason-
ableness of the classification under the
Fourteenth Amendment. No reliance was
placed on the parental right under the Four-
teenth Amendment or on freedom of relig-
ion under the First Amendment, with the
result that the court experienced little diffi-
17 State ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School
Conference v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W. 2d 43
(1954).
18 Id. at 47.
culty in rendering an adverse opinion. The
school was not built.
A year later a similar case arose in Cal-
ifornia. The City of Piedmont adopted an
ordinance which prohibited the building of
any but public schools in the residential
zone. An application was made for a permit
to build a Catholic parochial school but it
was denied on the basis of the zoning re-
striction. Since this zone comprises 98 % of
the area of the community, this had the
practical effect of excluding private schools
from the whole City of Piedmont. The ac-
tion of the building inspector was chal-
lenged in the District Cotirt of Appeals by
the Roman Catholic Welfare Corporation
of San Francisco. Argument was not con-
fined to a denial of equal protection of the
law. It was asserted positively that the ordi-
nance deprived parents of rights guaranteed
by the liberty clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This realistic position resulted
in a favorable decision. The court declared:
It is settled that parents have the basic
constitutional right to have their children
educated in schools of their own choice....
Having this basic right . . . no reasonable
ground for permitting public schools to be
constructed in Zone A and prohibiting all
other schools teaching the same subjects to
the same age groups can be suggested. 19
Arguments presented to the Supreme Court
of California on appeal included reliance
on the First as wcll as the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, the plaintiff cited
a decision of the United States Supreme
Court 20 holding that freedom of religion has
a higher dignity under the Constitution than
municipal or personal convenience. The ci-
tation of this and other First Amendment
cases materially strengthened the position
19 Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Pied-
mont, 278 P.2d 943, 944 (Cal. App. 1955).
20 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 151 (1943).
of the school with the result that the Su-
preme Court of California affirmed the deci-
sion of the lower court.2 1
Some zoning ordinances stop short of ab-
solute prohibition, but make the right to
erect a non-public school contingent on the
vote of the community. The best answer to
this type of an ordinance is the language
of the Supreme Court in Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette: 22
One's right to . . . freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend
on the outcome of no elections.23
The more common of the objectionable
zoning ordinances places unlimited discre-
tion in the planning board to determine
whether a parochial school may be erected.
This type of an ordinance was the subject
of review in the case of Diocese of Roches-
ter v. Planning Board. The facts in this
New York case disclosed that the Planning
Board had rejected the application to build
a parochial school. The lower courts upheld
the Planning Board. 24 The New York Court
of Appeals reversed, directing that a permit
be issued on the grounds that plaintiffs had
been deprived of their right to the free ex-
ercise of religion and their right to impart
and receive religious instruction and educa-
tion.2 5
The timeliness of and necessity for this
reappraisal of the right to educate is em-
phasized by current developments -storm
warnings which serve notice of movements
to undermine the very foundation of our
21 Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Pied-
mont, 45 Cal.2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955).
22 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
23 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 614, 638
(1943).
24 Diocese v. Planning Bd., 207 Misc. 1021, 141
N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 1 A.D.2d 86, 147
N.Y.S.2d 392 (4th Dep't 1955).
25 Diocese v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136
N.E.2d 827 (1956).
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schools. In California, the people will soon
vote on a referendum designed to take
away tax exempt status from our parochial
schools; in North Carolina2 6 and South
Dakota,27 dangerous regulatory legislation
has been enacted; in Oregon, the free school
book law28 will soon be the subject of'liti-
gation designed to secure a reversal of the
Supreme Court decision in the Cochran
case.29 A few months ago, the Masonic
Order (Scottish Rite) in Oregon distributed
a document to the public school teachers of
the State, which asserted that:
(parochial) schools do not serve a public
purpose so as to deserve public support
under a welfare theory for they teach not
only religion, but governmental doctrines
that are foreign and contrary to the Ameri-
can concepts of government.
There is an interesting coincidence about
this latest Masonic statement. In 1922,
Father Flood, Superintendent of Schools
for the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, com-
menting on a similar position of the Masonic
Order, addressed the National Catholic
Education Association Convention in Phil-
adelphia. He stated:
In our own country there is a growing
tendency to regard the Church as an intruder
in the field of education . . . on the absurd
theory that the child belongs primarily to
the State and only secondarily to the parents.
Though our courts have consistently con-
demned this inversion of rights, this statist
concept still has powerful support. It is nec-
essary therefore to reassert the principle
that parents have the prior right to educate
- a right which has been broadened and
strengthened through its recognition as a
First Amendment freedom.
26See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§115-255 to -57 (1957).
27 See S.D. CODE §15.3202(2) (Supp. 1952).
28 See ORE. REV. STAT. §328.520 (1958).
29 Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370
(1930).
